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1. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
represents a wholehearted commitment to an individual’s right to 
free expression.1  Historically, the Supreme Court has permitted 
the abridgment of that right only in very particular circumstances.  
In the majority of its decisions, the Court has adopted a speech-
protective stance, prioritizing an individual’s contribution to the 
common marketplace of ideas over government intervention.2  The 
notion is that the addition of any idea, even if it is disfavored, 
outlandish, or small-minded, to society helps to preserve an 
atmosphere of robust public debate.3 
The international community, in contrast, is warier of the 
externalities that accompany unchecked free expression and has, as 
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech . . . .”). 
2 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accept-
ed in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
3 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of picketing at a soldier’s funeral and stressing that “[public] speech 
cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt”); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (relying on the “bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment . . . that the government may not prohibit the expression of 
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable” to 
invalidate a flag burning statute); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 
(1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
CHANDRAMOULI (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2013  6:36 PM 
832 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:4 
 
a result, moved towards broader regulation of hate speech,4 or 
“speech designed to promote hatred on the basis of race, religion, 
ethnicity or national origin.”5  The reason for this movement stems 
in part from a post-World War II notion that characterizes hate 
speech not merely as the expression of a viewpoint, but also as an 
instrument of subjugation.6  In its desire to equally uphold the 
tenets of free expression and freedom from discrimination, 
however, the international community has failed to produce an 
articulate, comprehensive standard for hate speech regulation. 
In this Comment, I will suggest that incorporating frameworks 
from U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence into international law 
may enhance the precision of the current international standard for 
hate speech regulation.  In Part 2, I will examine the protections 
offered to hate speech in First Amendment jurisprudence in the 
United States.  In order to understand the American approach to 
regulating hate speech, it is necessary to first examine two related 
categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection into which 
hate speech may fall:  words that incite violence and “fighting 
words.”7  I will analyze the Court’s treatment of these exceptions in 
 
4 In this comment, I will use the term “hate speech” to denote not only 
speech, but also expressive conduct, see, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (holding that 
the act of burning the American flag in protest constitutes expressive conduct); 
U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (addressing whether the act of burning 
draft cards can be “protected ‘symbolic speech’ within the First Amendment”), 
and advocacy, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (outlining the current 
standard by which the U.S. Supreme Court evaluates governmental regulation of 
advocacy that directly incites violence). 
5 Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative 
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2003). 
6 See, e.g., id. at 1525–26 (emphasizing that, dating to the Holocaust, hateful 
and racist propaganda have been used to demean various ethnic groups); Frie-
drich Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a Con-
flict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 336 (1999) (indicating that hate 
speech regulation in Germany began as a “complex response to the darkest chap-
ter in German history”); Mariana Mello, Note, Hagan v. Australia: A Sign of the 
Emerging Notion of Hate Speech in Customary International Law, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 365, 376 (2006) (citing to Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist 
Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989), for the proposi-
tion that hate speech can be a “tool for subordination”). 
7 Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (describing fighting words as 
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace”). 
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its decisions Brandenburg v. Ohio8 and Dennis v. U.S., whose earlier 
holding on a similar issue was not completely overruled by 
Brandenburg.9  Part 2 will conclude by highlighting the Court’s 
continual deference to speech rights, even where the speech is 
discriminatory, through an examination of R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul10 and successive decisions. 
In Part 3, I will examine the ways in which United Nations 
(UN) instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)11 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),12 as well as international hate speech 
jurisprudence, including Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & 
Ngeze or the Media Case following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda13 
and other significant decisions in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Australia, contribute to the current international 
standard for hate speech regulation.  I will demonstrate that, at 
best, international attitudes towards regulating hate speech are 
inconsistent and that a precisely articulated standard does not yet 
exist in the international community. 
In Part 4, I will look to aspects of the hate speech regulation 
standard in the United States in order to recommend a more 
precise structure for the international standard.  To do this, I will 
address the factors on which the U.S. Supreme Court relied in 
 
8 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (providing the current standard the U.S. Su-
preme Court uses in evaluating government regulation of advocacy directly relat-
ed to violence). 
9 Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (distinguishing mere teaching from ac-
tive advocacy and determining, in that particular instance, that advocating to 
overthrow the government was a “clear and present danger” to the government 
and thus could not be protected under the First Amendment). 
10 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992) (invalidating a bias-
motivated Minnesota statute that sought to criminalize the display of a symbol 
which “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender” (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)) due 
to its overbroad scope and impermissible regulation of speech based on content). 
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
13 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence 
(Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/ 
rwmain?docid=404468bc2 (prosecuting the principal members of several Rwan-
dan media outlets for inciting genocide through the transmission of hate speech). 
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Brandenburg,14 as well as the portion of the Dennis holding that the 
Brandenburg standard does not directly overrule.  I will examine 
the potential impact of this oversight on international hate speech 
regulation.  I will ultimately recommend a more consistent 
international framework for hate speech regulation that borrows, 
in part, from the specificity of the American standard. 
2. CURRENT TREATMENT OF HATE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
Freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the 
Constitution is a sacred right.  Grounds for its protection include 
the (1) preservation of diversity of thought and the individual 
search for truth in the marketplace of ideas,15 (2) promotion of self-
government,16 and (3) encouragement of self-expression and 
individual autonomy.17  The primary purpose of the First 
Amendment is to prevent the government from suppressing 
speech in a way that would inhibit a community’s ability to engage 
in the free exchange of ideas.  As Justice Jackson eloquently stated 
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, “If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”18 
As a general matter, the Court has provided broad protection 
of individual speech rights, regardless of whether the content of 
 
14 See infra Part 2.1, notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
15 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM 60 (1993) (“[I]f any 
opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly 
know, be true.  To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.”). 
16 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 245, 263 (1961) (“In my view, ‘the people need free speech’ because they have 
decided, in adopting, maintaining and interpreting their Constitution, to govern 
themselves rather than to be governed by others.”). 
17 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (invalidating a New 
Hampshire law mandating the display of the state motto on automobile license 
plates and in doing so, affirming the First Amendment “right of individuals to 
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way 
New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable”). 
18 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  In this deci-
sion, the Court noted that in order to fully embrace “intellectual individualism 
and . . . cultural diversities,” society must bear the “price of occasional eccentricity 
and abnormal attitudes.”  The true “test of [the] substance [of the First Amend-
ment] is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”  
Id. at 641–42. 
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the speech is unfavorable.19  Accordingly, the Court has 
consistently held that government regulation of pure speech is 
justified only if the speech falls within a category that is expressly 
unprotected by the First Amendment.20  Precedent dictates that 
these categories include, primarily:  (1) fighting words,21 (2) true 
threats,22 (3) direct incitement,23 (4) obscenity,24 (5) child 
pornography,25 and (6) deliberate defamation or libel.26  In other 
words, hate speech that directly incites another to violence or that 
qualifies as a true threat—that is, speech that puts an individual in 
fear of his life or safety27—would likely be proscribable under the 
 
19 U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for at-
tachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for 
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”). 
20 See Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”). 
21 See id. at 572 (holding that some forms of expression have little social value 
and do not communicate ideas and are thus not afforded First Amendment pro-
tection). 
22 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (noting that, although the court 
struck down a Virginia statute banning cross burning on its face in this instance, a 
state can ban cross burning with intent to intimidate without violating First 
Amendment speech protections). 
23 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (articulating the principal 
that the “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press” do not extend to 
“advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
24 See, e.g., Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (outlining the current standard 
for identifying obscenity as unprotected expression); Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 
484 (1957) (holding that obscene expression is “utterly without redeeming social 
importance”). 
25 See N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1942) (“When a definable class of ma-
terial . . . bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in 
its production, . . . the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and . . . it is 
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First 
Amendment.”). 
26 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (identifying “actual 
malice,” or “knowledge that [the defamatory statement] was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not,” as the standard by which public officials 
can recover on defamation or libel claims). 
27 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1076-77, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining a 
“true threat” as a “statement which, in the entire context and under all the cir-
cumstances, a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted by those to 
whom the statement is communicated as a serious of intent to inflict bodily harm up-
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First Amendment.  On the other hand, the government would not 
be justified in banning hate speech due merely to its hateful 
content.28  The Court fears that such content-based bans will 
encourage future proscription of constitutionally legitimate 
speech.29 
2.1.   Incitement and Hate Speech Under Brandenburg and Dennis 
Advocates of restricting hate speech argue that the current U.S. 
standard is too speech-protective and that hate speech by its 
content alone spurs more hate, which is likely to lead to mass 
discrimination and violence.30  In Gitlow v. New York, Justice 
Holmes countered that notion by stating that “[e]very idea is an 
incitement”31—that, without a more speech-protective standard, all 
speech, especially speech that expresses views outside the 
mainstream, may be curtailed based merely on its potential to 
cause danger.32  The Court’s approach to regulating speech that 
incites violence offers insight into when it is appropriate to restrict 
hate speech on grounds that hate speech will trigger violent action. 
In Brandenburg, the Court outlined the standard by which to 
assess the constitutionality of a government restriction on speech 
 
on that person” (emphasis added), and holding that intimidating physicians from 
providing reproductive health services was an unconstitutional exercise of the 
American Coalition of Life Activists’ First Amendment rights). 
28 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392–93 (1992) (holding it im-
permissible to ban hate speech based merely on its message and stating that the 
state had “no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules”). 
29 See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Di-
lemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 215 (1991) (emphasizing the difficulty of de-
termining the precise parameters of racist and homophobic speech and the conse-
quent likelihood that content-based restrictions of hate speech could be overly 
broad). 
30 See Thomas J. Webb, Verbal Poison—Criminalizing Hate Speech: A Compara-
tive Analysis and a Proposal for the American System, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 445, 445-46 
(2011) (outlining the potentially destructive effects of hate speech, including “dis-
tress, intimidation, and fear,” and noting that “the United States, in effect, has be-
come a safe haven for the promotion of hate speech”). 
31 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925). 
32 See Nadine Strossen, Incitement to Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?, 25 S. ILL. 
U. L. J. 243, 250 (2001) (detailing historical arguments for restricting speech only in 
cases of imminent and substantial danger and explaining how these arguments 
shape the current speech-protective standard for hate speech regulation in the 
United States). 
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that incites violence.  In that decision, the Court determined that 
speech advocating violence may be proscribed only if the speaker 
intends to incite or produce actions that are imminent and 
lawless.33  In addition, the speech must be objectively likely to 
produce a violation.34  Accordingly, the Court has distinguished 
abstract teachings or generalized advocacy to engage in violent 
action from speech that is intended to produce an imminent 
violation and is likely to do so.35  Consistent with Justice Black’s 
dissent in Dennis,36 Brandenburg stands for the proposition that the 
mere advocacy of illegal action is not enough to justify the 
suppression of speech.37 
Even in cases such as NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, where the 
speech is especially inflammatory,38 the Court has erred on the side 
of protecting individual speech rights.39  The Claiborne Hardware 
decision clarifies the Court’s stance on acts of violence within a 
mass protest:  when a protest, set in a speech-rich context, is 
intermingled with isolated incidents of violence or penalty-
inducing behavior, only those who commit the acts of violence are 
 
33 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy 
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action.”). 
34 See id. at 448 (requiring that states distinguish between “the mere abstract 
teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force 
and violence” and “preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such ac-
tion” (quoting Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961))). 
35 Id.  
36 See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
chief reason for jettisoning the rule is the expressed fear that advocacy of Com-
munist doctrine endangers the safety of the Republic.  Undoubtedly, a govern-
mental policy of unfettered communication of ideas does entail dangers.  To the 
Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived from free expression were worth 
the risk.”) (emphasis added). 
37 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49 (holding that a “statute which fails to 
draw this distinction [between mere advocacy of illegal action and advocacy in-
tended to incite imminent lawlessness] impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
38 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982) (quoting 
speaker Charles Evers, with regard to a boycott of white merchants in Mississippi: 
“If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna [sic] break 
your damn neck.”). 
39 See id. at 928 (“An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with 
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause.”). 
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liable for their actions.40  The Court in Claiborne Hardware 
determined that the speaker Charles Evers’ speech, regardless of its 
tone and message, did not qualify as proscribable incitement under 
Brandenburg; instead, it was merely coercive advocacy.41 
2.2.   A Speech-Protective Framework for Hate Speech Regulation in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Virginia v. Black 
The majority in Claiborne Hardware stated that when assessing 
the validity of state regulation of individual speech rights under 
the First Amendment, the Court should look first for “precision of 
regulation.”42  Accordingly, the Court typically assesses hate 
speech restrictions with the utmost care, due to the possibility that 
they may stymie legitimate speech in the future.  The R.A.V. and 
Virginia v. Black decisions illustrate this concern.  Decided in 1992, 
R.A.V. reflects the Court’s standing methodology when analyzing 
hate speech restrictions.  The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance at issue in R.A.V. provided: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, 
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, 
but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which 
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses 
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct 
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.43  
The Court, while accepting the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
limiting construction of the statute to reach only fighting words, 
 
40 See id. at 916-18 (emphasizing that the state may impose liability only on 
those who engage in violent conduct or who are directly responsible for the con-
sequences of such conduct and not on those who engage in protected speech activ-
ity). 
41 See id. at 927–28 (indicating that Evers’ speech constituted neither fighting 
words under Chaplinsky nor incitement under Brandenburg, and concluding that 
“[t]he emotionally charged rhetoric of . . . Evers’ [speech] did not transcend the 
bounds of protected speech”). 
42 Id. at 916 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).  Button further 
stands for the proposition that “[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free ex-
pression are suspect” and that “precision of regulation” is most important in “ar-
ea[s] so closely touching [an individual’s] most precious freedoms.”  Button, 371 
U.S. at 438. 
43 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. 
LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). 
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held the ordinance facially unconstitutional because it sought to 
restrict a particular brand of fighting words on the basis of content, 
for reasons other than those underlying the decision to strip fighting 
words of their constitutional protection in the first place.44  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia further clarified the distinction by 
supporting the government’s right to “prohibit only that obscenity 
which is the most patently offensive in its prurience [or] which 
involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity,”45 but 
refusing to endorse viewpoint-based discrimination46 in speech 
regulations.  
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority in Black followed 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in R.A.V.47 when it held that Virginia 
could proscribe cross burning if the actor intended to intimidate 
because cross burning is a particularly vicious form of 
intimidation.48  It appears then that under the R.A.V.-Black scheme, 
the government may proscribe hate speech based on its content 
only when it (1) falls into a previously unprotected category under 
 
44 See id. at 391 (concluding that, since “the ordinance applies only to ‘fighting 
words’ that insult, or provoke violence ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion 
or gender,’” the regulation is “facially unconstitutional” because it seeks to elimi-
nate certain unfavorable viewpoints, as opposed to certain particularly vicious 
kinds of fighting words, the regulation is impermissible). 
45 Id. at 388. 
46 In other words, the government can impose restrictions of certain fighting 
words for being particularly likely to incite violence or certain brands of obscenity 
for being particularly lewd.  It cannot, however, impose restrictions based on 
viewpoint, e.g. a ban on only racist fighting words, regardless of how disfavored 
the viewpoint is.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 
(2011) (invalidating a California statute banning the sale of violent video games 
on the grounds that it was “wildly underinclusive, raising serious doubts about 
whether the State is pursuing the interest it invokes or is instead disfavoring a 
particular speaker or viewpoint”).  See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 
1217 (2011) (articulating that even highly offensive speech concerning general or 
public issues—here, signs containing messages such as “You’re Going to Hell” 
and “God Hates You”—deserves full First Amendment protection). 
47 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (“Virginia’s statute does not 
run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to 
intimidate.  Unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., the Virginia statute does not sin-
gle out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward ’one of the specified dis-
favored topics.’  It does not matter whether an individual burns a cross with in-
tent to intimidate because of the victim’s race, gender, or religion, or because of 
the victim’s ‘political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality.’”) (quoting 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391). 
48 See Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (highlighting cross burning as a long-standing 
symbol of imminent violence). 
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the First Amendment, and (2) represents a particularly virulent 
strain of the kind of speech in that unprotected category.  The 
Court’s two-step analysis constitutes a very precise basis for hate 
speech regulation.  And as the Court has not deemed many 
categories of speech unprotected under the First Amendment,49 
this foundation is also very speech-protective.  Ultimately, 
however, if the international community’s goal for hate speech 
regulation is to value both the speaker’s right to express a 
viewpoint and the listener’s right to remain free from 
discrimination, then adopting the R.A.V.-Black framework in its 
entirety is an incomplete solution.50 
As the following Part explains, the international community 
gives considerable weight to the non-violent yet harmful import of 
hate speech.  Though this priority is a noble backdrop for 
regulation, it holds perhaps too much potential for overregulation.  
Thus, the international standard for hate speech regulation may 
benefit from internalizing the precision, if not the near-absolute 
protection of individual speech rights, of the American 
framework.51 
3. CURRENT TREATMENT OF HATE SPEECH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International human rights instruments codify the rights to 
both freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination.  
Accordingly, the relationship between the rights of the speaker and 
the listener plays a larger role in protecting individual speech 
under the international approach than it does under the U.S. 
approach.52  The ICCPR, among many conventions and treaties, 
 
49 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying texts. 
50 See Webb, supra note 30, at 446 (noting that, under the current American 
standard for hate speech regulation, “hate speech cannot be criminalized when it 
is simply encouraging hatred, which can be as harmful as expressly inciting vio-
lence or threatening others”). 
51 See Massaro, supra note 29, at 243 (outlining drawbacks to the international 
approach to hate speech regulation by highlighting the “contested interpretation 
of equality” and noting that the role of government is not to “take a side in inter-
group hostilities, [albeit] if only to even the score,” but “to remain neutral when 
policing intergroup conflicts”). 
52 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 11, at art. 29(2) (“In the exercise of his rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by 
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”); Scott J. Catlin, A Proposal 
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addresses this balance.53  Prosecutor v. Nahimana and other 
landmark decisions demonstrate, however, that in a herculean 
effort to strengthen two often competing fundamental human 
rights, the international community is no closer to articulating a 
consistent standard for prosecuting hate speech.54 
3.1.   An Interplay of Rights:  Freedom of Expression and Freedom from 
Discrimination as Codified in International Human Rights 
Instruments 
Many international legal instruments explicitly designate the 
right to free expression as a fundamental human right that is 
worthy of protection.  Article 19 of both the UDHR and the ICCPR 
highlights the “right to hold opinions without interference”55 as 
well as the right to receive a wide breadth of information through 
any media.56  Article 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) further protects a child’s freedom to “seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”57  In addition, 
Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) requires state parties to 
 
for Regulating Hate Speech in the United States: Balancing Rights Under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 795 (1993–
1994) (emphasizing that the fundamental tenets of international human rights 
agreements “require a balancing of the speaker’s right to free speech against the 
listener’s right to have her inherent human dignity protected from hate speech 
injuries”); Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response 
to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT’L L. 57, 71 (1992–1993) (“The rights of equality and 
non-discrimination are central in the Universal Declaration and no rights, includ-
ing speech rights, may be asserted to destroy them.”). 
53 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at arts. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of expression”) and 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law.”). 
54 See generally Alexander Zahar, The ICTR’s “Media” Judgment and the Rein-
vention of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide, 16 CRIM. L.F. 33, 47–48 
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348507 (arguing that the Media 
judgment failed to articulate solid reasons as to why the broadcasted and written 
statements are at issue, despite publicly preaching hate, constituted direct and 
public incitement to genocide). 
55 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19(1); UDHR, supra note 11, at art. 19. 
56 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19(2); UDHR, supra note 11, at art. 19. 
57 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 13, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
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criminalize “all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority 
or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination.”58 
These instruments also support the notion that the right to free 
expression does not stand alone.  Rather, it is measured in relation 
to other fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom 
from discrimination.  Article 19(3) of the ICCPR indicates that 
freedom of expression is contingent on the fulfillment of “special 
duties and responsibilities” and may be restricted on grounds of, 
most notably, “respect of the rights . . . of others.”59  This 
qualification is a reflection of the preambles to both the UDHR and 
ICCPR, which emphasize the importance of recognizing and 
maintaining basic dignity and equality among all individuals.60  In 
addition, Article 26 of the ICCPR states that “all persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law.”61  
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR addresses hate speech directly, 
stating that all “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall 
be prohibited by law.”62  Although it invokes the incitement 
language of Brandenburg and Dennis, Article 20 broadens the range 
of proscribable speech based on content to include not only speech 
that incites violence, but also speech that incites discrimination and 
hostility.63  Further, the ICCPR obligates state parties to adopt laws 
against this kind of speech.  This provision is outlined in Article 2: 
 
58 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination art. 4(a), Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
59 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19(3) (emphasis added). 
60 See id. pmbl. (“[r]ealizing that the individual [has] duties to other individu-
als and to the community to which he belongs . . . .”); UDHR, supra note 11, pmbl. 
(“[T]he peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
. . . the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 
women . . . .”). 
61  ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 26 (emphasis added). 
62 Id. at art. 20(2). 
63 See Catlin, supra note 52, at 799 (detailing Article 20’s broad reach in its 
prohibition of incitement to discrimination and hostility, and indicating that this 
feature of the international approach is most at odds with the American approach 
to regulating hate speech); see generally David Filvaroff et al., The Substantive Rights 
and United States Law, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 54 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993). 
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Where not already provided for by existing legislative or 
other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.64 
The ICCPR’s provision regarding incitement to hostility and 
discrimination are not sufficiently speech-protective to square with 
the American standard.65  As a result, the United States made 
reservations to its ratification of the ICCPR.  In order to maintain 
ultimate discretion with regard to speech regulation, the U.S. 
Senate declared the ICCPR a non-self-executing treaty, or one that 
American courts cannot directly enforce until Congress and the 
Executive Branch pass appropriate legislation.66  
3.2.   Regulating Hate Speech in the Context of Incitement to Genocide 
in Rwanda:  A Reminder of the Dangers of Unchecked Expression 
Unlike in other contexts in international law, hate speech 
regulation in the context of genocide is similar to the American 
system of regulating incitement.  In its 2003 Prosecutor v. Nahimana 
decision following the Rwandan genocide, the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) adopted a precise standard 
for prosecuting hate speech that incorporated many of the speech-
protective elements that compose the current American standard 
for regulation of incitement.67  In that case, the ICTR was right to be 
speech protective; it exercised its power to convict an individual 
for a genocide-related crime based solely on the transmission of 
hateful speech with appropriate caution.  Uniquely, the ICTR was 
 
64 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 2. 
65 See Catlin, supra note 52, at 799 (noting that the international approach, due 
to its broader parameters, necessitates more content-based regulations, many of 
which might be impermissible under the American standard for hate speech regu-
lation). 
66 See id. at 802 (emphasizing the “dichotomous approach to the implementa-
tion of [the United States’] international human rights agreements” and stressing 
that although the United States maintains a commitment internationally to the 
tenets of such agreements, it “reserves the option to only partially implement 
them domestically”). 
67 See infra notes 82–90 and accompanying texts. 
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also able to underscore the value that international law places on 
the right to non-discrimination by ultimately convicting three 
principal figures in the Rwandan media for incitement to 
genocide.68  This result also fits; restricting speech that incites 
genocide—that is, prioritizing the right to freedom from 
discrimination when that discrimination takes the form of ethnic 
cleansing—is legitimate, if only to deter future occurrences. 
However, Nahimana and related post-genocide decisions stand 
separately.  Genocide is a horror of such magnitude that it 
validates arguments on both sides of speech regulation.69  In less 
dire cases, it is more difficult to equally prioritize the rights to 
freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination.  Courts 
around the world have thus shown varying degrees of prudence 
when proscribing hate speech.  Nonetheless, it is helpful to 
examine the ICTR’s decisions for their analytical clarity and 
illumination of the power of hate speech and the worst 
consequences of allowing absolute freedom of expression. 
3.2.1.  Background of the Rwandan Genocide 
Current President of the International Association of Genocide 
Scholars, Professor William A. Schabas, wrote: the “road to 
genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech.”70  Beginning in 
the 1930s and spurred by Belgian colonialism, the ethnic divide 
between the Hutu and Tutsi races in Rwanda hardened over six 
decades leading to the 1994 genocide whose 100-day span oversaw 
the massacre of over one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus.71 
In 1993, Hutu extremists established a radio station called 
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM),72 which was 
 
68 See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying texts. 
69 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, 
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 325, 330 (2004) (“The ICTR’s pathbreaking ruling shows that 
equality and speech rights can be harmonized when courts face the power of me-
dia to kill.”). 
70 William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 MCGILL 
L.J. 141, 144 (2000). 
71 See Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? 
An Estimate, 6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 85 (2004). 
72 See Alison Des Forges, Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994, in THE MEDIA 
AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 41, 44 (Allan Thompson ed., 2007) (detailing the 
harmless beginnings of RTLM and emphasizing that the “station was meant to be 
the voice of the people . . . ”). 
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supported by the government-controlled Radio Rwanda, to 
broadcast messages of hate.  Prior to the creation of RTLM and the 
start of the Tutsi extermination, the French-language tabloid 
Kangura,73 whose primary demographic was the illiterate Hutu 
population, advocated the killing of Tutsis.74  Fear-mongering 
through threats and rumors played a significant role in inciting 
hatred of Tutsis in the local population.75  
The prevalence of hate media intensified following the death of 
Rwandan President Habyarimana in 1994.  RTLM broadcasts 
incited Hutus to eliminate the inyenzi or “cockroach,”76 which 
became a euphemism for the Tutsi people during the genocide.77  
Despite the damaging effects of hate media in Rwanda, the United 
States declined intervention, reasoning in part that shutting down 
the broadcast of these hateful messages would impermissibly 
interfere with the sovereignty of the Rwandan government and 
would bear an uncomfortable resemblance to censorship.78  
 
73 See Zahar, supra note 54, at 45 (characterizing Kangura as “a Hutu-
nationalist rag, hateful of the [Tutsi-created Rwandan Patriotic Front or] RPF and 
the threat it posed to what Ngeze saw as the glorious Hutu revolution of 1959, 
when the masses threw off the Tutsi yoke, founded the Republic, regained their 
dignity, and set Rwanda on the path to modernity”). 
74 Id. (indicating that Kangura aimed its advocacy towards illiterate Rwan-
dans). 
75 See Des Forges, supra note 72, at 45 (documenting the RTLM’s turn to sen-
sationalism in 1993 and its twin aims of “underlin[ing] supposed Tutsi brutality 
and heighten[ing] Hutu fears of Tutsi”). 
76 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sen-
tence, iv (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ 
refworld/rwmain?docid=404468bc2, (defining inyenzi as: “[c]ockroach; group of 
refugees set up in 1959 to overthrow the new regime; sympathizer of RPF; some-
times used to refer to Tutsi”). 
77 See Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 
¶ 44 (June 1, 2000), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case% 
5CEnglish%5CRuggiu%5Cjudgement%5Crug010600.pdf (convicting Georges 
Ruggiu, a Belgian broadcaster who pled guilty to committing incitement to geno-
cide in Rwanda and who admitted that by 1994 “the term ‘Inyenzi’ [had become] 
synonymous with the term ‘Tutsi’ . . . [and had come] to designate the Tutsis as 
‘persons to be killed’”). 
78 See Gregory H. Stanton, The Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning Failed, 1 
J. AFR. CONFLICTS AND PEACE STUD. 6, 9 (2012), available at http:// scholarcom-
mons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=jacaps (indicating that 
the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, and the State Department de-
fended RTLM’s  right to broadcast as freedom of speech) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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3.2.2.  Prosecuting Hate in the Aftermath of the Genocide 
The Nahimana decision marked “international criminal law’s 
first reexamination of the link between mass media and mass 
slaughter” since the Nuremburg Trials.79  In that case, the ICTR 
addressed the accountability of Rwandan hate media outlets in the 
genocide.  The Trial Chamber found three Rwandan journalists of 
radio and print media, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, guilty of several counts under 
the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”), including direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide.80  These convictions on the 
count of incitement to commit genocide81 indicate that hate speech 
can be sufficient to constitute one of international law’s most 
atrocious crimes.82 
The ICTR previously addressed the crime of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide in its 1998 decision, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Paul Akayesu.83  This decision considers the implications of the 
terms ‘public’ and ‘direct,’ as well as the mens rea required to incur 
 
79 Recent Case, International Law — Genocide — U.N. Tribunal Finds That Mass 
Media Hate Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes Against 
Humanity. — Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Dec. 3, 2003), 117 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2769 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Case: The Media Case]. 
80 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sen-
tence, ¶¶ 1091-1094 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=404468bc2. 
81 Note that in its 2007 decision, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the convic-
tions of Nahimana and Ngeze for direct and public incitement to commit geno-
cide.  See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgement 
(Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/ 
Court%20Documents/ICTR/Nahimana%20et%20al_Appeal%20Judgment.pdf 
(supporting the Trial Chamber’s distinction between general hate speech and in-
citement to commit genocide, id. ¶ 715, and upholding the Trial Chamber’s con-
victions of Nahimana and Ngeze for direct and public incitement to commit geno-
cide, id. ¶¶ 1051, 1113). 
82 See MacKinnon, supra note 69, at 328-29 (“The Media Case is notable for 
holding a newspaper editor and a broadcast executive criminally accountable not 
only for the crime of what they said, but for the crimes their words did . . . .”). 
83 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998), 
available at 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement
%5Cakay001.pdf. 
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criminal liability.84  ‘Public’ refers to a “call for criminal action to a 
number of individuals” by means of a speech, public threats, radio 
and television broadcasts, or communication through other mass 
media.85  ‘Direct’ refers to incitement that is specifically intended to 
elicit a response, in contrast with “vague or indirect suggestion.”86  
In order for the incitement to be direct, the target audience must 
also be objectively likely to act on it.  In other words, the audience 
must understand the speech at issue, and the speech must be 
persuasive.87  Both Akayesu and the Nahimana appeal indicate that 
the presence of genocidal intent88 alone is sufficient to constitute a 
crime, regardless of whether the speech at issue successfully 
triggered genocide.89  
The Akayesu analysis resembles the standard for proscribing 
hate speech that constitutes incitement under current U.S. law.90  
Similarly, the ICTR’s evaluation in Nahimana aligns with that of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg and Dennis.  Through an 
examination of the specificity and tone of the hate speech at issue 
and the context of its dissemination, the Tribunal sought to 
determine whether the speech actively advocated violence or 
 
84 See id. ¶¶ 556-60 (outlining the factors considered in identifying incitement 
to be public or direct and stating that the required mens rea lies in the specific in-
tent “to directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide”). 
85 Id. ¶ 556 (citing the International Law Commission’s definition of public 
incitement). 
86 Id. ¶ 557. 
87 See id. ¶¶ 557-58 (“The Chamber will . . . consider on a case-by-case basis 
whether, in light of the culture of Rwanda . . . acts of incitement can be viewed as 
direct or not, by focusing mainly on the issue of whether the persons for whom 
the message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof.”). 
88 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgement ¶ 
523 (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court% 
20Documents/ICTR/Nahimana%20et%20al_Appeal%20Judgment.pdf (citing the 
definition of genocidal intent in Article 2(2) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group”) (internal quotations omitted). 
89 See id. ¶ 678 (emphasizing that “the drafters of the [Genocide] Convention 
intended to punish direct and public incitement to commit genocide, even if no 
act of genocide was committed, the aim being to forestall the occurrence of such 
acts”); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 561 (Sept. 2, 
1998), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish% 
5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cakay001.pdf. 
90 See supra Part 2.1, notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
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simply educated in the abstract.91  Although largely cabined to 
circumstances as extreme as genocide, the reasoning in the 
Nahimana decision is an influential example of precision in hate 
speech regulation.92 
3.3.   An Inconsistent Treatment of Hate Speech in Recent 
International Jurisprudence 
As demonstrated by hate speech decisions and regulations in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, the 
international standard for hate speech regulation becomes less 
consistent in the absence of an equalizing circumstance.  
Depending on the country and its history and culture, the standard 
vacillates between more and less speech-protection, closer to and 
further from the American system. 
3.3.1.  Canada 
Canada derives its commitment to combating hate speech in 
part from Germany’s history and the dissemination of hateful 
propaganda during the Holocaust.93  For example, in marked 
opposition to the American system of speech regulation, the 
Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Keegstra94 sustained the 
conviction of a teacher charged with making anti-Semitic 
comments to his students.95  In that case, the teacher was convicted 
under a statute that criminalizes the “promotion of hatred . . . 
towards any section of the public distinguished by color, race, 
religion or ethnic origin.”96  The statute does not mention 
 
91 See Recent Case: The Media Case, supra note 79, at 2772 (emphasizing the Tri-
bunal’s consideration of context when determining whether the speech at issue 
“was intended to promote an offense or merely to educate persuasively”). 
92 See MacKinnon, supra note 69, at 330 (“The strong but subtle principles ar-
ticulated in The Media Case, applicable to many legal areas of speech regulation, 
will have an impact around the world, not least in countries that have tended to 
see themselves as exempt from horrors of Rwanda’s gravity.”). 
93 See Kübler, supra note 6, at 337 (“[T]he German example has inspired legis-
lation in other countries.  The Canadian Rules, for example, have been . . .  based 
on the premise that the successes of modern advertising, the triumph of impudent 
propaganda such as Hitler’s, have qualified sharply [the] belief in the rationality 
of man.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
94 R. v. Keegstra, [1990)] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
95 See id. at 698. 
96 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 319(2) (Can.). 
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incitement to violence and is similar to the statute in R.A.V., which 
the U.S. Supreme Court deemed overbroad.97  However, the 
Canadian Supreme Court concluded that although the statute 
appears to violate the principles of Section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,98 it is constitutional under Section 
1 of the Charter.99  
The Court’s reasoning in Keegstra is based on principles of 
“individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing.”100  This 
language resembles First Amendment ideals of the search for truth, 
tolerance of diversity, and the preservation of robust public 
debate.101  However, the Canadian view is that these ideals are best 
achieved by prioritizing individual dignity and social harmony.102  
The dissemination of hate speech undermines these priorities.  
3.3.2.  United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom does not have a consistent framework for 
hate speech regulation.  Historically, sustaining a conviction on a 
count of seditious libel, for example, required a showing of 
intent.103  The Race Relations Act of 1965,104 although broad in its 
definition of incitement, included a similar requirement, which 
 
97 See supra notes 10, 43-46 and accompanying texts. 
98 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), at Sec. 2(b) (protecting 
“freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication”). 
99 Id. § 1 (“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”) (emphasis 
added). 
100 See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 728 (citing the Canadian Charter). 
101 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying texts. 
102 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1544 (underscoring that under the Canadian 
hate speech regulation standard, the transmission of hate speech is “more danger-
ous than its suppression as it is seen as likely to produce enduring injuries to self-
worth and to undermine social cohesion in the long run”). 
103 See Stanley Halpin, Racial Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact 
of International Human Rights Law upon the Law of the United Kingdom and the United 
States, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 463, 467-68 (2010-2011) (detailing past seditious libel laws 
in the United Kingdom that required “the element of intentional promotion of ac-
tual violence to be present”). 
104 RACE RELATIONS ACT, 1965, c. 73, § 6 (1) (Eng.). 
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made it difficult to prosecute hate speech.105  Over the years, a 
number of statutory provisions have emerged, broadening the 
United Kingdom’s commitment to restricting hate speech.  In 1986, 
hate speech amounting to harassment of a group became 
punishable under the Section 5 of the Public Order Act.106  The 
enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act followed in 
1997.107  In 2006, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act made it a 
criminal offense in England and Wales to publish, broadcast, or 
otherwise disseminate hate speech targeting religious groups.108  
The overall effectiveness of these statutes, however, remains 
unclear.109  As a general matter, the judicial system does not appear 
to favor hate speech prosecutions, particularly when that speech is 
unlikely to incite actual violence.110  In addition, although there is a 
relatively high incidence of reporting hate speech crimes, a large 
number of prosecutions are dropped.111 
3.3.3.  Germany 
Germany maintains a particularly strong commitment to 
regulating hate speech due to the virulent strain of hate 
propaganda perpetuated by the Nazis that led, ultimately, to the 
Holocaust.  As in Canada, German courts view the right to self-
expression as part of a broader bundle of individual rights and 
 
105 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1546 (noting that although the Race Rela-
tions Act of 1965 centered on “incitement to hatred rather than . . . incitement to 
violence,” it did have an intent requirement) (emphasis added).  Note that the 
Race Relations Act of 1965 was amended by the Race Relations Act of 1976, and 
the intent requirement was dropped. 
106 PUBLIC ORDER ACT, 1986, c. 64, §§ 5-6 (Eng.). 
107 PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT ACT, 1997, c. 40, § 7 (Eng.). 
108 RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED ACT, 2006 (Eng.). 
109 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1547 (arguing that the statutes discussed 
“provide more tools in the British legal arsenal against hate speech, but have not 
thus far led to any clearer or more definitive indication of the ultimate boundaries 
of punishable hate speech in the United Kingdom”). 
110 See Halpin, supra note 103, at 469 (tracing the declining number of hate 
speech prosecutions in the United Kingdom). 
111 See id. at 473 (citing MGMT. INFO. BRANCH, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., 
RACIST AND RELIGIOUS INCIDENT MONITORING (2007) to illustrate the high percent-
ages of dropped prosecutions and the “few violations of the 1998 Hate Crime Act 
[that are] identified as accepted for prosecution”). 
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duties to the community.112  Today, the German government may 
impose criminal liability for speech that inflicts harm on human 
dignity or targets particular minority groups, based on their 
religious or ethnic origins.113  Furthermore, in contrast to the 
American standard for hate speech regulation, the requirement 
that hate speech must meet an incitement threshold is absent or 
very minimal under the German standard.114 
3.3.4.  Australia 
In Australia, unlike in other countries, the right to free 
expression is a strictly common law notion.115  As a result, every 
state has its own set of restrictions on discriminatory or derogatory 
speech.116  These state regulations and federal law117 appear to 
specifically target victimization based on race, and the most 
common avenues of redress are civil penalties.  The Australian 
government rarely enforces the few criminal hate speech 
regulations that currently exist.118  One reason for this may be that 
the focus on civil remedies represents a more comprehensive 
system of regulation, as criminal statutes are typically more 
narrowly construed.119 
Even in the absence of a codified right to free speech, however, 
Australian courts have sought to uphold speech rights.  To 
 
112 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1549-50 (delineating Germany’s commit-
ment to preserving the balance “between the self-expression needs of speakers 
and the self-respect and dignity of listeners”). 
113 See id. at 1551 (explaining that the German government has a wide variety 
of legal tools it uses to combat hate speech). 
114 See id. at 1551-52 (outlining the lower standards of proof that are required 
in Germany, with specific reference to prohibitions on denials regarding the Hol-
ocaust). 
115 Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech and the Australian Legal and Political Land-
scape, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA 2, 4-5 (Katharine Gel-
ber & Adrienne Stone eds., 2007) (contrasting the implied right to free speech in 
Australia with the explicit right to free speech in other countries, such as the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom). 
116 See id. at 5 (listing Australia’s various anti-discrimination laws by jurisdic-
tion). 
117 See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 18C (Austl.) (prohibiting of-
fensive behavior likely to “offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person” 
because of “race, colour or national or ethnic origin”). 
118 See Gelber, supra note 115, at 8-9. 
119 See id. at 9-10. 
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accomplish this, they have both opposed and relied on 
international legal principles.  In the 2003 decision Hagan v. 
Australia, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (“Committee”) recommended the removal of a sign 
containing a racial slur from a stadium.120  In that case, stadium 
management refused, and the Australian government did nothing 
to ensure compliance with the Committee’s recommendation.121  In 
a similar validation of free speech principles, the Australian High 
Court in Coleman v. Power122 set aside a conviction under the 
Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act123 for the use of “any 
threatening, abusive, or insulting words to any person.”124  
Although the majority relied primarily on the Australian 
constitution to enforce free speech obligations, Justice Kirby’s 
concurrence relied on international law,125 specifically Article 19 of 
the ICCPR.126  
4. LOOKING TO THE CURRENT STATE OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH A MORE PRECISE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARD 
The U.S. Supreme Court has restricted hate speech based on its 
content only in cases where that speech falls into a category that 
has been previously deemed unprotected under the First 
Amendment.127  Thus, the reasoning that the Court has used to 
analyze government regulation of incitement,128 fighting words,129 
 
120 Hagan v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Elim. of Racial Discrim. Comm., 62d 
Sess., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003). 
121 Mello, supra note 6, at 367 (citing AAP, UN Racism Ruling Ignored, THE 
MERCURY (Austl.), July 12, 2003, at 15). 
122 Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 35 (Austl.). 
123 Vagrants, Gaming, and Other Offences Act of 1931 (Qld.) (Austl.). 
124 Id. § 7(d) (“Any person who, in any public place . . . (d) [u]ses any threat-
ening, abusive, or insulting words to any person . . .  shall be liable.”). 
125 See Coleman, 220 CLR at 82 (Kirby, J., concurring) (emphasizing the value 
of considering treaties and principles in international law when resolving domes-
tic disputes). 
126 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19 (protecting the right to political expres-
sion). 
127 See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying texts (listing primary categories 
the Court recognizes). 
128 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that incitement 
means “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and “likely to 
incite or produce such action”). 
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and threats130 underlies the Court’s approach to hate speech 
regulation.  The principle underlying this precision is speech 
protection.  First Amendment jurisprudence has limited speech 
restriction primarily to speech that is closely associated with acts of 
violence.  On the international stage, however, the right to speak is 
qualified in a more significant way by the non-violent effects of 
that speech. 
Nonetheless, the international community could benefit from 
emulating, in part, the precision of the American system.  As this 
Comment suggests, the international community places value on 
freedom from discrimination; however, the magnitude of that 
value varies across cases and countries.  In the case of the 
Rwandan genocide, for example, that value increased dramatically, 
as discrimination led directly to mass violence.  However, in cases 
such as Keegstra or Hagan, where the discriminatory speech is 
hateful but not ostensibly harmful, the line becomes difficult to 
draw. 
To begin the process of streamlining the international system of 
hate speech regulation, it may be useful to incorporate a detailed 
imminent violence requirement.131  Although the ICCPR prohibits 
speech that incites “discrimination, hostility or violence,” there are 
few parameters around the proximity of causation.132  In an age of 
instant transcontinental access, the international community must 
more specifically outline the role of timing between the speech and 
its violent or discriminatory effects through regulation.133  
 
129 See Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (providing the definition 
for “fighting words” as words that, when spoken, “inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace”).  
130 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating the Court defines a 
true threat as a statement made with the foreseeable expectation to be understood 
as conveying an intent to harm); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding 
cross burning can be banned under the Fourth Amendment if done with intent to 
intimidate). 
131 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (requiring imminent action in its two 
prong test). 
132 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 20(2) (relating to only “advocacy of na-
tional, racial or religious hatred”). 
133 See MacKinnon, supra note 69, at 330 (noting that the Nahimana decision 
“will be carefully studied, including in cases in which incited events have yet to 
happen or occur at far remove from the inciting words”) (emphasis added). 
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Another notion that has not yet been incorporated into 
international hate speech regulation involves the portion of the 
Dennis holding that the Brandenburg majority did not overrule.  The 
Dennis decision focuses on the issue of how to treat active 
advocacy, or the indoctrination of members of a group to commit 
acts of violence, when imminence is not a factor.134  The open 
question is, in other words:  if an individual is actively 
advocating—as distinguished from teaching abstractly on a topic 
such as overthrowing the government135—acts of violence through 
hate speech, but there is no immediate plan to carry out such acts, 
can that individual be prosecuted for disseminating hate? 
This concern is especially relevant in cases of terrorist groups 
whose existence is premised exclusively on the commission of acts 
of violence.136  In these cases, although the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held against prosecution based solely on membership, evidence 
that a member is actively advocating violence through hate speech 
may be sufficient for prosecution, even if that violence is not 
imminent in the way that the Brandenburg standard prescribes.  
Accordingly, in the 2010 decision Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project,137 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a material-
support statute, which makes it a crime to “knowingly provide[] 
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or 
attempt[] or conspire[] to do so.”138  The Court concluded that 
knowingly providing support to a terrorist organization, even 
 
134 See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (detailing that the indictment in 
this case was for “wilfully [sic] and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize . . . a so-
ciety, group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and 
destruction of the Government . . . by force and violence, and (2) . . . to advocate 
and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government 
. . . by force and violence,” which constitute violations of Sections 2 and 3 of the 
Smith Act). 
135 See id. at 511 (citing the lower court’s distinction that in order for advocacy 
to be considered active, it must be “reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite 
persons to such action”). 
136 See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA 71–73 (2002) (detailing the ex-
tensive training of members of Al Qaeda, including instruction in the use of ex-
plosives and hand-to-hand combat as well as psychological preparedness with 
regard to suicide missions and the maintenance of religious zeal). 
137 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
138 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (2009). 
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without specific intent to further terrorist activity, is sufficient for 
prosecution.139 
The Holder decision adds depth to the portion of the Dennis 
holding that Brandenburg did not overturn.  The Court clarified that 
its decision in Holder does not constitute a reversal in precedent 
regarding an individual’s freedom of association under the First 
Amendment.  On the other hand, the Court emphasized that § 
2339B “does not penalize mere association, but prohibits the act of 
giving foreign terrorist groups material support.”140  Further, the 
Holder decision does not prevent writing or speaking about 
terrorist organizations, or even adopting membership.141  As Holder 
involved an as-applied challenge, the Court did not consider the 
far-reaching implications of allowing § 2339B to pass constitutional 
muster, thus overlooking, at least in part, the intent and imminence 
requirements that are central to Brandenburg.  However, Holder 
remains an indication of flexibility and awareness of context—to 
which the international legal community at times affords undue 
weight at the expense of self-expression142—within the 
comparatively rigid Brandenburg paradigm. 
In the international legal community, the Holder decision and 
the portion of the Dennis holding that this comment discusses are 
especially valuable when balancing speech rights—which 
Brandenburg’s intent and imminence requirements favor—with 
their effects on the community.  In Holder, for example, the Court 
deferred to legislative findings concerning “the sensitive interests 
in national security and foreign affairs.”143  Accordingly, the Court 
found it foreseeable that materially supporting an organization 
whose existence is premised on terrorist activity will aid broader 
terrorist activity, even if the intent and imminence requirements of 
Brandenburg are not directly fulfilled.144  Ultimately, the 
 
139 Holder, supra note 137, at 2708–09. 
140 Id. at 2711. 
141 Id. at 2723. 
142 See Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: Crimalising Incitement to Violence, (2005) 28 
U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 868, 886 (“[E]xtending the law of incitement through 
new sedition offences and the power to proscribe organizations is a hasty and im-
prudent overreaction which inevitably criminalises valuable contributions to pub-
lic discussion.”). 
143 Holder, supra note 137, at 2711. 
144 Id. 
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incorporation of an imminent violence requirement and further 
specificity regarding speech regulation in cases where hate speech 
is used to indoctrinate violent groups are essential to achieving a 
more consistent system of hate speech regulation in international 
law. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In a time, more than any other, of instant access, the power of 
rhetoric is at its height.  Extremist and fanatical groups disseminate 
hate relentlessly across all media, appealing to emotional and 
psychological vulnerabilities and laying an insidious groundwork 
of discrimination and violence.  On the international stage, the 
issue is whether the law should respond to these messages of 
hate—many of them untargeted or targeted at large groups over 
individuals. 
Europe and the UN have undertaken measures to criminalize 
general incitement to terrorism.145  In 2005, for example, the 
Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism, which mandates State parties to criminalize “public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence.”146  In this context, 
public provocation is defined as “the distribution . . . of a message 
to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist 
offence, where such conduct . . . causes a danger that one or more 
such offences may be committed.”147  As a general matter, these 
broader criminal provisions, which would likely not pass muster 
under Brandenburg, appear to target “an environment and 
psychological climate conducive to criminal activity,”148 unrelated 
to a specific intent to harm or offend.  Though First Amendment 
jurisprudence in the United States does not favor content-based 
speech restrictions except in the most well-defined contexts, 
 
145 See Saul, supra note 142, at 868–69 (“Internationally, pressure to criminal-
ise generalised incitement to terrorism has emanated from Europe and the United 
Nations.”). 
146 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, opened for 
signature May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 6907. 
147 Id. 
148 Mordechai Kremnitzer and Khalid Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition, in 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 147, 197 (David 
Kretzmer and Francine Hazan, eds. 2000). 
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current political and social tensions may demand more oversight 
from international law. 
Conversely, against this backdrop of increasing unrest and 
media influence, it is more important than ever to maintain the 
distinction between vigilance and suppression.  In his book 
Defending My Enemy:  American Nazis, the Skokie Case, and the Risks 
of Freedom, Aryeh Neier wrote, “To defend myself, I must restrain 
power with freedom, even if the temporary beneficiaries are the 
enemies of freedom.”149  This sentiment is the prevailing notion 
among protectors of speech rights—that hateful speech is best 
countered with more speech, allowing for an atmosphere of robust 
public debate and fueling innovation, human capital and economic 
development, and social change.  To this end, organizations such 
as Human Rights Watch have determined that restricting hate 
speech does not necessarily further equality.150  In addition, in 
countries such as Sri Lanka and South Africa, hate speech 
restrictions are enforced haphazardly and to the detriment of the 
least privileged communities.151  However, in an era where speech 
is increasingly powerful, especially in the hands of groups whose 
sole aims are violence and destruction, it is important to continue 
to refine this ideal to keep pace with the changing nature of 
society. 
International law has always recognized the inalienable rights 
to human dignity and freedom from discrimination; however, its 
efforts to protect these rights without devaluing other fundamental 
rights are inconsistent at best.  In order to strengthen the global 
commitment to non-discrimination, the international community 
must clarify its standard for hate speech regulation.  To do this, it 
must adopt the precision of the American speech-protective lens—
a lens that declared a Birmingham parade ordinance an 
unconstitutional infringement on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
 
149 ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, 
AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 5 (E.P. Dutton Univ. Press 1979). 
150 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ‘Hate Speech’ and Freedom of Expression, A HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH POLICY PAPER, Mar. 1992, at 4 (indicating that there is “little connec-
tion in practice between draconian ‘hate speech’ laws and the lessening of ethnic 
and racial violence or tension”). 
151 Sandra Coliver, Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?, in STRIKING A BALANCE: 
HATE SPEECH, FREE SPEECH, AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 373-74 (Sandra Coliver ed., 
1992) (calling hate speech laws into question for being “vehicles for persecution of 
critics” and for “[compromising] the right of dissent”). 
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right to civil protest in 1969.152  A more coherent system of hate 
speech regulation in the international community will help to 
strengthen the relationship between free speech and freedom from 
discrimination for speakers and their audiences.  And both sides of 
the conversation will be clearer. 
 
 
 
 
 
152 See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (holding that an or-
dinance prohibiting any public demonstration without a permit that will be 
granted or withheld at the sole discretion of an official is an unconstitutional cen-
sorship of First Amendment rights). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/9
